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Sport, militarism and diplomacy: training bodies for China
(1960–1966)
After the Great Leap Forward, the Chinese government changed its strategy
from ‘Go all out, aim high and achieve greater, faster, better and more economic
results’ to ‘Readjustment, consolidation, filling out and raising standards’.
( ). The Chinese Sport Ministry, in term, also changed its
strategy of a mass sports campaign and moved towards using limited resources to
raise the standards of competitive sport and to produce world class athletes. Also
in this period, China faced the Sino-India border conflict, the Sino-Soviet split and
the Vietnam War all of which influenced China’s domestic and foreign policies and
which, in turn, had profound impact on Chinese sports policy and practice. Sport
had never before been so close to militarism. Some major sports events such as the
Fourth Asian Games in 1962, the Games of the Newly Emerging Forces
(GANEFO) in 1964 and the Second National Games in 1965, took place in this
period and added more complexity to Chinese politics and diplomacy.
The rise of sports militarism
Three crucial factors contributed to the rise of sports militarism in the first half of the
1960s. The first was the Sino-Indian Border Conflict which was caused by a dispute
over the sovereignty of three sectors claimed by both China and India. The departing
British had left the Sino-Indian border undefined when India became independent in
1947. Although China’s other neighbours faced similar problems, borders had been
settled satisfactorily through diplomatic negotiations. However, India refused
Beijing’s call for negotiations and a ‘standstill agreement’ to prevent clashes in
1958. Nehru began to accuse China of ‘aggression’ because the Chinese Communist
Party refused to surrender to Indian claims.1
India initiated an assertive policy of sending troops into the disputed regions in
1959 and this resulted in several conflicts between the two sides.2 Despite repeated
warnings from Beijing India attempted in 1961 to a establish military presence in
all the disputed territories in order to repel the Chinese. On 12 October 1962,
Nehru officially proclaimed India’s intention to take over the disputed areas. China
took it as a declaration of war and responded that the Chinese were not going to
wait to be attacked.3 Eight days later, the Chinese launched an offensive and
forced the Indian troops to retreat some distance. The war ended on 20 November
1962 when China declared a ceasefire and showed its intention to withdraw. Over
the following months, in order to show goodwill,4 Chinese troops retreated to the
north of the McMahon Line and kept to the territory in Tibet which they had
claimed in 1960.5
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The Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) 1964 reports showed that it was India’s
offensive forward policy that had provoked China’s counterattack. Neville Maxwell,
a British scholar, concluded,
When China crushed India in 1962, the fault lay with India, or more specifically, it was a
hopelessly ill-prepared Indian Army that provoked China on orders emanating from
Delhi, and paid the price for its misadventure in men, money and national humiliation.6
The second incident was the Sino-Soviet split. In the context of the cold war, the
People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the USSR were close allies during the Stalin
era. After Stalin passed away in 1953, his ideology, theory and policies were
abolished by his successor Nikita Khrushchev, the first secretary of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Khrushchev adopted new domestic and foreign
policies, hoping to build up the strength of the country. He also initiated a campaign
of de-Stalinisation in February 1956, accusing Stalin of causing terror, deportations
and executions in the late Stalin era.
When the news was reported in China, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
leaders questioned Khrushchev’s theory. Chairman Mao enjoyed supreme power
in the CCP as had Stalin in the CPSU. De-Stalinisation may have threatened his
power and he criticised Khrushchev’s call for de-Stalinisation. Also the USSR’s
new foreign policy favoured a peaceful coexistence with the United States and
undermined the Sino-Soviet alliance. The CCP leaders believed that Khrushchev
had betrayed not only the Stalinist Road but also Marxism and Leninism.
Consequently, ideological conflicts between the PRC and the USSR began to
grow.7
The Sino-Soviet friendship was further ruined by several incidents that happened
in 1958 and 1959.8 By the end of the 1950s, the CPSU believed that the CCP was not
really Marxist, whereas the CCP leaders were convinced that the CPSU had betrayed
Stalinism, Leninism and Marxism. The Sino-Soviet alliance was on the verge of
collapse.9 In July and August 1959, the Soviet Union cancelled all foreign aid
projects and pulled out of the PRC the Soviet specialists working there.10 After the
Sino-Indian border conflict broke out in August 1959, the Soviet News Agency
(TASS) publicly announced on 9 September 1959 that the USSR supported India.11
A few days later, between 15 and 28 September 1959, Khrushchev paid his visit to
the United States. These two incidents indicated that the Sino-Soviet friendship had
reached an end.12
In addition, the CCP leaders regarded the Vietnam War as an offensive of the
United States against China. After the 1954 Geneva Agreement, Vietnam was
divided into two parts: the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) led by the
Vietnamese Workers’ Party (VWP) in the North and the Republic of Vietnamese
(Southern Vietnam) led by a pro-American government.13 Although China did not
publicly support North Vietnam, the PRC provided a great amount of aid to the
DRV between 1956 and 1963.14 The CCP leaders believed that by supporting the
Communist regime in Vietnam, China could secure its interests in East Asia and
compete against the capitalist bloc led by the United States.
In response to the United States’ incursion in Vietnam in the early 1960s, the
Chinese government decided to provide more support for the DRV. Subsequently,
the Chinese government offered the DRV, free of charge, 90,000 firearms. In August
1964, the US President Johnson decided to use military forces to support South
Vietnam and protect America’s interests in Southeast Asia.15 The USA went on to
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launch a series of military actions against North Vietnam in early 1965.16 The CCP
leaders were worried about possible military threats from the United States and
announced in April 1965 that it was the obligation of the Chinese people and the
CCP to support the North Vietnamese communists.17
China now, 10 years after the Korean War, faced more military threats and the
danger of national security from India, Taiwan, South Vietnam, the USA and the Soviet
Union. At a meeting with General Vo Nguyen Giap, the DRV’s DefenceMinister, on 5
October 1962, Mao Zedong stated, ‘In the past few years, we did not think much about
the possible attacks from the imperialists. Now we must carefully think about it’.18
National security moved to centre stage and the concept ‘Prepare forWar, Fight against
the Invaders’ was at the core of China’s domestic and foreign policies.
Meanwhile in sports matters, in March 1960 the Sports Ministry issued the
‘Directive on the Establishment of National Defence Sports Clubs’. In April, the
Ministry of Education and Ministry of Health issued the ‘Announcement on
Promotion of Patriotic Sports and Health Activities in Education Sectors’; in
January 1961, the Sports Ministry and the Ministry of National Defence jointly
issued the ‘Notification on the Promotion of Aviation Clubs’.19
One of the major preparations for war was to develop military sport to train
students, the youth and Chinese people to be skilled militia men and women. A
nationwide campaign was initiated to promote mass military training.20 The Office of
Civil Defence ( ) was established at every level of the country: from the
people’s communes to factories; from schools to government departments. One of
their functions was to liaise with sports organisations, education bureaux and army
to training people to be soldiers for the possible wars. The slogan was ‘To train all
Chinese citizens to be soldiers’ ( ).
All people aged 16 to 25 were encouraged to join the militia. However, before
they could join they would have to pass a serious ‘political examination’ ( ).
Only those who came from the families of three generations of poor peasants and
workers were allowed to join the militia. The elite troops of the militia were
called ‘the backbone militia’ ( ). People from a family background of
landlords, industrialists, bourgeoisie and anti-revolutionaries, were strictly
forbidden to join the militia, since the Party would not trust them to hold
guns in their hands.
Military training activities included swimming, long distance running, shooting,
mountain climbing, martial arts, radio sport ( ), aero modelling ( ),
marine modelling ( ) and parachute jumping. Some of the sports pre-existed as
mass sports. Some of the sports were military sports. Therefore, a special section or
department was added to the local and provincial sports commission called ‘military
sports section/department’. Budgets and instructors were specially provided for this
new development.
School physical education classes were now turned into military training courses.
A primary school student in Santai County, Sichuan province recalled the military
sports activities carried out in his school and home town in 1964:
‘Promote Sport, Exercise the Body, Protect Our Country’ was the slogan at that
time. . ..Some students in my school were selected to join the Red Scarf Shooting Team.
I became a member of the team in 1965 and practiced shooting with sporting rifle twice
a week. Most of the time, we practiced target shooting. Sometimes we were lucky
enough to shoot used light bulbs with real bullets. . ..There were shooting teams in
secondary schools. One of my friends was a student in the secondary school. He was a
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member of the shooting team and they used real rifles. . ..Their training also included
formation drills, gymnastics, swimming, cross-country racing and mountain climbing.
. . . Santai County was very poor in the 1960s so there was no proper swimming pool.
We had to swim in the Fujiang River. . ..My father worked in the local government and
he and his colleagues had to learn to swim in the river as part of the military training. I
remember one day he returned home and told us that the head of the local government
had almost drowned when they swan across a river.21
The militia men and women in factories and communes were taking a
certain amount of time off from their work every week to undertake military sports.
A poor peasant in the Red Flag Commune, Tongnan County of Sichuan province,
recalled:
In our People’s Commune 200–300 young men and dozens of young women between 18
and 25 years old were selected to be ‘Backbone Militia.’ Most of them were sons and
daughters of poor peasants. They were equipped with rifles. In slack farming seasons
they practised formation drills, running and shooting. I saw them learning to swim in
the Fujiang River in the summer.22
To encourage more people to participate in military sport, Mao Zedong swam in
the Ming Tombs Lake in Beijing accompanied by students from the Capital Normal
University and soldiers from the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) on 16 June 1964.
While swimming Mao told the students and soldiers: ‘Swimming is a good sport that
challenges natural forces. You should swim in big rivers and the sea to train your
mental and physical strength’.23 After Mao’s symbolic swim the Sports Ministry and
the PLA jointly issued ‘Promoting Swimming among the Masses’ in May 1965. It
pointed out: ‘Swimming can promote people’s physique, and cultivate the spirit of
bravery and tenacity. It is important for training masculine bodies for national
defence’24. Also in May 1965, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist
Youth League issued a policy document ‘Important Issues in Military Sport’ to
clarify nine key military sports: shooting, swimming, air defence, throwing, radio,
camping, cross-country racing, mountain climbing and martial arts. It required all
members of the Youth League and the Chinese youth to participate in the military
sports listed in the document and to prepare for war.25
The number of registered militia reached 163.28 million in the early 1960s.
Among the 4.56 million were the ‘Backbone Militia’.26 All efforts were being made to
serve national defence and prepare for war. As indicated in the ‘Report on the 1965
National Sports Congress’ published by the Central Government and the Sports
Ministry on 15 May 1965:
Great efforts have been made to promote military sport. We have followed Mao Zedong
Thought on People’s War and serve the purpose of national defence. Our priority will be
to continue to promote mass military sport, and to train the militia men and women in
order to provide back-up force for national defence. 27
Mao Zedong was pleased with the achievements of all the people who had become
soldiers, especially the women in the militia. He wrote a poem ‘For the Female
Soldiers’ ( ) in 1965 which read:
Valiant heroines grasping rifle guns,
Morning twilight illuminating the drilling ground.
What a grand aspiration Chinese women taking on,
Favouring military uniform other than lady’s costume.28
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Training communist champions
While the whole country was becoming an army camp and ordinary people were
being turned into soldiers, elite athletes faced more challenges. They were expected to
be soldiers as well as athletes. They were taught to treat the sports fields as
battlefields and their counterparts as enemies. They were expected to beat their
enemies and win battles and wars at all costs since a sport competition was war
without fire. In order to prepare them to win ‘wars’ the principle was ‘Train the
soldiers [athletes] at home and compete against the foreign competitors’
( ).29
Learning from the PLA, a series of training philosophies were introduced to train
masculine bodies for sports competitions. In March 1964 the Sports Ministry issued
a Directive that required athletes to learn from the PLA. They were particularly
required to learn the PLA’s tradition of never fear hardship and death (see figure
1).30 In December 1964 the Sports Ministry’s National Congress announced that
athletic training should be copied directly from the PLA’s training philosophy and
methods. They were firstly: ‘Three basic rules and one principle’: this referred to
understanding the complexity; the strictness; and the mentality of preparing for real
battle; and principles of heavy and intensive training ( ). Secondly there were,
‘Three fearless’: meaning fearless of hardship, fatigue and difficulties ( ).
Thirdly, there were ‘Five commitments’: meaning total commitment to political
loyalty; to training of the body; to understanding technique; to tough and hard
mental training; and to fierce competition’ ( ).
Scientific training was not the concern here. Therefore, athletic training time was
extended and exercise intensity increased. Furthermore, athletes were required to
spend time living in the army barracks and undertaking military and physical
training with the soldiers.
While the body was trained, the mind had also to be cultivated. The Communist
champions must be loyal to the Party, commit themselves to political missions and
achieve greater success for the country. The Sports Ministry issued ‘Regulations for
the Ideological and Political Education of Athletic Teams’ in May 1964. This
required sports governing bodies at all levels to establish departments for ideological
and political education. The departments would be in charge of athletes’ political
education in subject areas including collectivism, patriotism and socialist/communist
morality. Under the leadership of the departments, political instructors and teachers
would be sent to all sports teams to help athletes to study Marxism, Leninism and
Mao Zedong Thought and to understand current political affairs every week. The
Regulations also required the athletes to work in the countryside, factories and
military camps for 15 to 30 days per year. It believed that the peasants, workers and
soldiers would teach them a work ethic and loyalty to the party.
In 1964 Xu Yinsheng, a table tennis player, set a good example to all Chinese
athletes. Xu captured the world title in the men’s doubles at the World Table Tennis
Championships in 1963. He was invited to give a talk to female table tennis players
in September 1964 to help them to prepare for their forthcoming international
competitions. During his two-hour talk, Xu vividly convinced the audience that it
was Mao Zedong Thought, the ‘Spiritual Atom Bomb’, which had guided him to
overcome all the hardships and difficulties and to achieve success. Xu’s talk was
published as an essay by the Ministry of Sport and distributed as compulsory
learning material for all Chinese athletes, especially the athletes in national teams.
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Mashal He Long also showed this essay to Mao Zedong in early January 1965. Mao
was pleased with it and commented on 12 January 1965:
Comrade Xu Yinsheng’s talk and Comrade He Long’s comment should be printed and
circulated among the comrades attending the Central Government’s Work Conference.
They should re-print and distribute it when they go back [to their ministries and
departments]. Comrades, should we refuse to learn from this young fighter? The talk is
based on dialectical materialism. . ..I have not read anything as good for years.
Although he talks about how to play table tennis what we can learn from it are theory,
politics, economy, culture and military affairs. If we do not learn from this young
athlete, we will be doomed soon.31
With Mao’s endorsement, five days later, the People’s Daily published Xu’s essay
on the front page and Xu found himself to be the role model not only for Chinese
athletes, but also the general public.32 He became as perfect a Communist champion
as the Party could have hoped for.
Standardisation of the sports elite system and structure
During the first half of the 1960s there took place a process of standardisation of the
system and structure of elite sport. The Sports Ministry issued the ‘Regulations of
Outstanding Athletes and Teams’ in March 1963 to improve the elite sport system
and management structure in order to enhance the level of performance. It listed 60
regulations in respect of training, competition, education, coaching, athletes, medical
support, organisational structure, management and leadership. In May 1963 another
policy document ‘Inspection of the National Records and the Establishment of the
Reward System’ was issued. According to this, athletes would be awarded medals for
their achievements by the Sports Ministry.33
Spare-time sports schools were a key reserve of talent for Chinese elite sport.
The Sports Ministry issued the ‘Regulations of Spare-time Sports Schools’ in
September 1964. It aimed to cultivate the young and talented. It stated that spare-
Figure 1. Sichuan People’s Press. ‘Athletes should learn from the People’s Liberation Army
and equip their minds with the right focus- like the direction of a rifle’ (Poster). Chengdu:
Sichuan People’s Press, 1965.
Source: Sichuan People’s Press, 1965. Available from: http://edu.cnr.cn/pic/jczt/200808/
t20080815_505070328.html
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time sports schools should be set up within the local and provincial sports
commissions. The heads of the sports commissions were the heads of the sports
schools. There would be different forms of sports schools, boarding, half-boarding
and after school training, depending on the financial resources provided by the
sports commissions. Full-time coaches and training facilities and grounds would be
provided by the sports commissions. For boarding sports schools academic tutors
would be employed.
In June 1965 the Sports Ministry again emphasised the significance of sports
schools: ‘Spare-time sports schools must be established throughout the country to
provide elite athletes for professional athletic teams. Some provinces and
autonomous regions may build selected sports schools into reserve teams for
professional sports squads’.34 It was in favour of the sports boarding schools
structure. It proposed that this kind of school would be able to offer half a day for
academic work and half a day for sports training. In this way it was hoped that
students would fully develop their sports potential as well as keeping up with their
academic education.
With the standardisation of management structure, coaching, training and the
education system, a three-layer pyramid was formally established with the spare-time
schools at the bottom, the provisional sports teams in the middle and the national
squads on the top.
The Sports Ministry at a national sport congress in January 1965 announced its
goal was to let the ten key sports reach the world level in ten years time. The level of
performance in 1965 was impressive: 189 national records were broken 1,177 times
by 259 female athletes and by 239 male athletes35 (see figure 2); and 66 Chinese
athletes broke world records of 28 events 41 times.36
The Second National Games in 1965
The Second National Games was scheduled to take place in 1962. However, due to
the recession and famine brought about by the Great Leap Forward (GLF), the
Games did not happen until 1965 when the economy was gradually recovering. The
country needed a national gathering to celebrate national unity, to demonstrate
the development of military sport and its readiness for any possible war; and to show
the level of elite sports. The Sports Ministry pointed out that the Games would
‘Facilitate the development of mass sport, cultivate talented young athletes, improve
Figure 2. National records broken by athletes from 1960 to 1965 (times).
Source: Figure developed by the author.
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the level of performance and thus enhance China’s international status and political
influence by achieving success at the New Emerging Force Games and other
international sports competitions’.37
The Second National Games took place in Beijing on 11 September 1965.
Altogether, 5,922 athletes (3,911 male and 2,011 female) from 28 provinces and the
People’s Liberation Army participated in 22 sports and 130 national records were
broken 469 times by 331 athletes.38 The Games reflected the growing militarism and
the slogan of the Games was ‘Exercise the body; Build our Motherland, Defend our
country’.
Mashal He Long highlighted the role of sport in national defence at the opening
ceremony of the Games:
During the past 16 years, guided by the Party’s and Chairman Mao’s instructions, sport
contributed to the promotion of people’s physique, the construction of the country,
national defense and served proletarian politics. . ..People participated in swimming,
shooting, radio sport and mountain climbing. They trained themselves for the purpose
of protecting the mother country. They will be prepared to answer the mother country’s
call to beat American imperialists and their running dogs who dare to invade our
country . . .39
He praised the elite athletes who have fulfilled their political commitment:
During the past 16 years, our elite athletes have broken national records more than
5,700 times and world records more than 100 times. They have captured 13 world titles
for the country. . ..The Chinese Table Tennis Team has won great honour for the mother
country by winning medals at the World Table Tennis Championships. The National
Mountain Climbing Team has conquered the summit of Mount Everest. Our athletes
have demonstrated the Chinese people’s spirit of struggle. The Chinese people should
learn from them.40
Lu Dingyi, head of the Propaganda Department of the CCP Central Committee,
the powerful body in charge of all political publicity and the media in China,
emphasised again, at the closing ceremony of the Games on 28 September 1965:
Recently, the United States is expanding the Vietnam War. India is invading Pakistan
and continues to make troubles at the Sino-India border. Therefore, we must be alert
and be prepared for War. Sport policy and practice must respond to the current
situation. We must promote mass sport and military physical exercises. The aim is to
mobilize all the Chinese people to exercise their bodies and their minds to defend our
country.41
The group calisthenics, performed by 16,000 people at the opening ceremony,
fully demonstrated the close relationships between sport, politics and militarism.42
The show was entitled ‘Ode to Revolution’. It had seven scenes: ‘The Prelude’; ‘Raise
the Revolutionary Torch’; ‘Self-Reliance and Go All Out’; ‘The People’s Commune’;
‘Hold the Gun Tightly’; ‘The Red Successors’ and ‘Carry the Revolution on to the
End’. The themes and performance were heavily coloured by class struggle,
nationalism, militarism, socialism and communism.43
The Second National Games was portrayed by the Chinese media as a celebration
for the country’s achievements in sport since the GLF and a new starting point for
Chinese athletes’campaign to reach the world level.44 In addition, the participation of
hundreds of athletes from 28 minority ethnic groups was highlighted by the media and
demonstrated national unity to the general public.45
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China, the Non-Aligned Movement and the 1962 Asian Games
The world changed rapidly after the Second World War. The awakening of
nationalism in the colonies of the western powers in Asia, Africa and Latin America
gave birth to many independent nation states. In the 1940s and 1950s, 50 nations
claimed independence.46 These newly emerging countries changed the landscape of
world politics forever.
The PRC was a member of the socialist camp and, therefore, Chinese foreign
policy in the 1950s focused on strengthening its relationship with the Soviet Union
and other East European countries. It also focused on supporting national liberation
movements in Asia, Africa and Latin America. It began to forge relationships with
newly independent countries that had a similar historical background to China and it
established foreign relations with some Asian countries including India (1950),
Burma (1950), Vietnam (1950), Indonesia (1951) and Pakistan (1951).
The key milestone in the relationship between China and the emerging
independent countries came in 1955 when the Asia-Africa Conference was held in
Bandung under Indonesian leadership. The original suggestion that invitations be
sent to the Afro-Asian members of the United Nations (UN) was now endorsed by
India and Burma and was now extended to include other non-member countries such
as Cambodia, the two Vietnams, the Gold Coast and China. The Soviet Union was
not included despite its control of the Asian heartland.47
The conference took place in April 1955. The attendance of representatives of
29 countries at the conference was a considerable diplomatic success. Sukarno’s
speech at the opening of the conference began: ‘This is the first inter-continental
conference of coloured people in the history of mankind!’. He went on: ‘Sister
and Brothers, how terrific and dynamic is our time. . ..Nations, States have
awoken from sleeps of centuries. . ..Hurricanes of national awakening and re-
awakening have swept over the land . . .’.48 But in spite of the wind of change,
colonialism was still not dead and resistance to it was one of the things which
bound together the nations represented at Bandung. Sukarno continued: ‘For
many generations out people have been the voiceless ones in the world. We have
been the unregarded, the people for whom decisions were made by others whose
interests were paramount, the peoples who lived in poverty and humiliation. Then
our nations demanded, nay fought for independence, and achieved independence,
and with that independence came responsibility’.49 The conference developed the
sense of a common interest as nations standing apart from the great power blocs
with shared experiences of domination under colonialism and it represented the
underdeveloped countries.
By participating in the Bandung Conference, the PRC established a close
relationship with the non-aligned countries. It was attempting to present a new
image to the nations of Southeast Asia. The Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai was
remarkably successful in conveying an impression of conciliation and reason-
ableness, saying he had come ‘to seek unity and not to quarrel’.50
However, for the United States, the conference was a challenge to the Southeast
Asia Treaty Organization, which had been created in 1954 for collective defence
against socialist countries in Southeast Asia.51 The United States’ Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) condemned the conference as ‘another example of
Sukarno’s fraternization with the Communist Chinese. He was ‘in the process of
selling his charisma, if not his soul, to the communists’.52
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Following the Bandung Conference, Sukarno developed the concept of
struggle between the Newly Emerging Forces and the Old Established Forces
(the old forces of domination). In his address to the UN in September 1960 with
the title ‘To Build the World Anew’, he argued that the real conflict in the world
was not the cold war but that between imperialism in its new forms on the one
hand and justice, quality and freedom for the long exploited peoples of the world
on the other.
One year later, the first conference of heads of states of governments of non-
aligned countries was held in Belgrade in September 1961. Indonesia had helped to
sponsor it. The concepts of the New Emerging Forces and the Old Established
Forces; and that the safety of the world was always threatened by the Old
Established Forces were accepted by the conference. The Non-Aligned Movement
(NAM) was formed in 1961. It was an intergovernmental organisation of states
which aimed to ensure ‘the national independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity
and security of non-aligned countries’; and to ‘struggle against imperialism,
colonialism, neo-colonialism . . . and any form of foreign aggression, occupation,
domination, interference or hegemony, as well as the struggle against the policies of
big powers or blocs.’.53 Its aim was to unite all the developing countries in Asia,
Africa and Latin America and it asserted equal rights with the Old Established
Forces in aspects of national and regional interests (see Figure 3).
By 1961 the Sino-Soviet split had become obvious. China’s foreign policy was to
oppose USSR revisionism as well as US imperialism.54 The departure from the
Soviet and East European camp urged China to grasp quickly the implications of the
NAM in terms of its long-term potential impact on the non-aligned emerging states
and the opportunity to create a new world structure in which China could play its
role. Zhou Enlai wrote to the conference,
I would like to congratulate the conference on behalf of China. Furthermore, I wish the
conference will contribute to Asian, African, and Latin American people’s struggle for
national independence, their struggle against invasion and interference by imperialism,
their struggle against new and old colonialism, and their struggle for world peace.55
Figure 3. Member states of the non-aligned movement.
Source: Afrasiabi, K.L., available at: http://www.iranreview.org/content/Documents/Non_
Aligned_Movement_Backs_Iran.htm
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In return, the conference acknowledged the PRC as the only legitimate
representative of China. It stated in the Declaration of the Heads of State of
Government of Non-Aligned Countries:
Those of the countries participating in the Conference who recognize the Government
of the People’s Republic of China recommend that the General Assembly in its
forthcoming Session should accept the representatives of the Government of the
People’s Republic of China as the only legitimate representatives of that country in the
United Nations.56
Soon after the establishment of the NAM, sport became a battlefield of
international politics between the eastern socialist bloc, the western capitalist bloc
and the Newly Emerging Forces. It all began in 1962 when the Fourth Asian Games
took place in Indonesia. The Asian Games had started in 1951 under the leadership
of the Asian Games Federation (AGF). The purpose of the Games was to ‘promote
the realisation of understanding and friendship among all nations and . . . start a
process which, as time passes, will go on cementing the friendly ties between the
peoples of Asia’.57
The Games were recognised as a regional Games and were acknowledged by
the International Olympic Committee (IOC).58 The Fourth Asian Games was to
be held in Indonesia in 1962. At the time, President Sukarno had proclaimed
himself the leader of the Bandung Conference and established himself as one of
‘The Initiative of Five’ of the NAM.59 He looked on the Games as a means to
strengthen his own position among the Newly Emerging Forces of Asia, Africa
and Latin America that were ‘struggling against capitalism and trying to create a
new world order’.60 The PRC was a useful ally in this endeavour and was invited
to join the Asian Games in Jakarta. The PRC also intended to use this
opportunity to establish its position as a leader of the Newly Emerging Forces of
the world.
However, there was a major obstacle. The PRC was not a member of the AGF.
The Republic of China (Taiwan) was a founding member of the AGF and had
represented China in the Asian Games in 1954 and 1958 respectively.61 According to
AGF rules Taiwan would be entitled to participate in the 1962 Asian Games.
Therefore, the Indonesian Embassy in Beijing informed the Chinese government at
the end of 1961 that Jakarta would have to invite Taiwan to participate in the Fourth
Asian Games and it consulted with Beijing on solutions.
The Chinese Sports Ministry listed four possible solutions for Indonesia: 1) Invite
the PRC instead of Taiwan to represent China; 2) Not invite Taiwan or the PRC; 3)
Invite Taiwan, but not recognise it as a country and, therefore, not raise its national
flag at the Games; and 4) Invite Taiwan and accept Taiwan as a country.62
The second solution was seen as the most feasible one. Therefore, the Chinese
Sports Ministry in Beijing and the Chinese Embassy in Jakarta began to convince
Indonesia to adopt this solution. Premier Zhou Enlai and Foreign Minister Chen Yi
both wrote to President Sukarno to persuade him to exclude Taiwan.
Nevertheless, the Jakarta organising committee sent an invitation letter on 1
March 1962 to Ho Geng-sheng (Hao Gensheng), who was a board member of the
AGF and the representative of Taiwan, and invited him to attend a preparation
meeting for the Fourth Asian Games in Jakarta in April 1962.
Beijing was not happy about this news. Although the PRC was not a member
of the AGF it had had diplomatic relations with Indonesia since 1951. On 31 May
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the Chinese embassy in Jakarta sent a memo to the Indonesian government pointing
out:
The Chinese government sincerely wishes that the Asian Games held by Indonesia will
be a great success. But the Chinese government cannot ignore those imperialists and
their followers who want to use the Asian Games to create ‘two Chinas.’ These activities
will not only harm the friendship between the PRC and Indonesia, but also harm the
stand of Indonesia’s fight with imperialism.63
After careful consideration Indonesia decided not to invite Taiwan to attend
the Games. At the same time, along with the protests of some Arab countries on the
issue of Zionism, Indonesia decided not to issue visas to Israeli athletes either.64
The political action of Indonesia enraged the IOC and some international
federations. They warned Jakarta that the Fourth Asian Games would face the
sanction of not being recognised, as they could not tolerate a sports event mixed up
with politics. The International Federation of Athletics announced that it would not
recognise the results of track and field events at the games. The International
Federation of Weightlifting asked its member states not to send athletes to the
Games, otherwise the states’ memberships would be suspended.65 Taiwan also
protested against Jakarta’s decision. Yan Zhengxing, head of the Taiwan Asian
Games Delegation, stated publicly: ‘I sincerely urge all athletes and sports
organizations to uphold justice, disqualify Indonesia as the host of the Fourth
Asian Games and refuse to acknowledge the Games’.66
Jakarta ignored the warnings from the IOC and the International Federations
(International Federations). On 24 August 1962 the Foreign Minister of Indonesia
formally announced that it would stick to its decision to reject Taiwan and Israel
from participating in the Games. The IOC and the IFs immediately stated that they
would not recognise the Games, since they could not tolerate such a political Games.
India was not happy with Indonesia’s decision.67 India’s relations with Indonesia
had begun to experience a downturn in the early 1960s. Retzlaff pointed out that
Conflicting interests and aims had in several cases become increasingly apparent, vide
India’s opposition to Indonesia’s attempts to convene a second Bandung Conference,
and the negative response by many of the nations at the Belgrade Conference of non-
aligned nations in 1961 to Prime Minister Nehru’s plea that the issues of world peace
and disarmament were of greater urgency than anti-colonialism.68
At the same time, the Sino-India border conflict had begun. The relationship
between India and China deteriorated to its lowest point.
Against this background G.D. Sondhi from India, ‘the Father of the Asian
Games’ who was also a member of the IOC, arrived in Jakarta on 3 September 1962
and publicly criticised Indonesia’s rejection of Taiwan and Israel’s participation in
the Games. His criticism angered Indonesian nationalists and a demonstration took
place outside the Hotel Indonesia in which Sondhi was staying. Retzlaff stated that
‘An estimated 20,000 Indonesians stormed the Indian Embassy and sought to tear
down the Indian flag’.69
Finally, the Fourth Asian Games took place between 24 August and 4 September
1962 in Jakarta. Altogether, 1,460 athletes from 16 countries competed at the
Games. Indonesian athletes performed very well and won 48 medals, including 21
gold medals. The Fourth Asian Games was a demonstration to the Jakarta populace
of Indonesia’s standing in the eyes of her neighbours. It secured for the nation a fine
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sports complex at Senayan and it excluded competitors from Taiwan and Israel
despite the pressure from the old-established powers. It was a sign of the nation’s
greatness and of its independence. Although the PRC did not participate in the
Games it had successfully lobbied for the exclusion of Taiwan from the Games, and
so had shown its significant political and diplomatic influence on Indonesia and
other NAM nation states.
China and the GANEFO
After the Fourth Asian Games, on 7 February 1963, the IOC decided to suspend the
membership of the Indonesian Olympic Committee for an indeterminate period of
time for not having protested against its government’s discriminatory action against
Taiwan and Israel. The IOC stated:
The IOC and the IFs [International federations] are completely opposed to any
interference in sport on political, racial or religious grounds, and particularly any which
prevents the unhindered passage of competitions and officials between their member
countries.70
Two days later, on 9 February, the Indonesian Sports Ministry responded with a
strongly worded statement and a proposal of a new world games – the Games of the
Newly Emerging Forces (GANEFO):
The exclusion of Indonesia from the Olympic Games will not harm Indonesia. On the
contrary, Indonesia will now have the freedom to organize a new games without the
participation of imperialists and colonialists. The new games is GANEFO – the Games
of the Newly Emerging Forces – Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the socialist
countries. . ..It is time that the new emerging countries should have a revolution to
destroy the spirit and structure of the international sports movement which is controlled
by the imperialists and colonialists.71
Three days later, on 12 February, China declared its support and sent a
congratulatory telegraph to the Indonesia Olympic Committee.72 The Arab League,
which appreciated Jakarta’s decision to exclude Israel from the Games, also
requested its member states to support Indonesia and protest against the IOC.73
On 13 February 1963 President Sukarno announced that Indonesia would
withdraw from the IOC and would hold a new world games, the GANEFO, to fight
against the IOC. He even compared the significance of the GANEFO to the
Indonesian Independent Movement against Dutch colonists between 1945 and
1949.74 Sukarno stated that in Indonesia sport was used to further the country’s
political aims, namely, world friendship and peace. For Sukarno and the PRC, the
Olympic Games were but a tool of the old-established forces that engaged in
discriminatory actions against Asian, African, and Latin American nations. Now
these discriminated nations were going to use the GANEFO as a tool to oppose the
old-established forces.
Jakarta and Beijing had begun to prepare for the GANEFO long before the IOC
suspended Indonesia’s membership. The idea had first appeared in Sukarno’s speech
responding to Sondhi’s criticism in September 1962. He stated:
it is the view and attitude of the majority of the AGF, which is the representative of 13
nations that signed the convention of Asia-Africa Bandung Conference, that the Asian
Games does not truly reflect the true spirit of Bandung. Right now, we will stage a new
games among the New Emerging Forces, as soon as possible, yes, in 1963.75
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The idea of hosting theGANEFO was released to the press in September 1962. It
was immediately supported by Beijing. The Chinese government gathered experts
from the foreign and sports ministries to analyse the feasibility of organising a new
games. After careful study, they concluded that since the Second World War, the
colonial and semi-colonial countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America had become
independent, but that imperialist countries which dominated the IOC still denied their
rights in international sports affairs. The new games, therefore, would attract those
newly independent countries. At the same time the new games could provide a unique
stage for the PRC to demonstrate its power over and influence on those countries.
Two months after the Fourth Asian Games, a Chinese sporting delegation visited
Indonesia on 22 November 1962 to exchange views on the GANEFO. The PRC
agreed to use its influence to persuade some Asian and African countries to join the
Games. A special research department was set up to advise Indonesia on the
GANEFO.
Liu Shaoqi, Chairman of the PRC, visited Indonesia in April 1963 and signed
with Sukarno a joint declaration that accused the IOC and reaffirmed that China
would support the GANEFO: ‘The Chinese government condemns the IOC’s
arbitrary decision to exclude Indonesia from the Olympic Games. The Chinese
Government strongly supports the GANEFO proposed by President Sukarno and
will make best efforts to contribute to the GANEFO’.76 Although China was still
suffering the economic crisis brought by the Great Leap Forward, the Chinese
government helped to build new stadiums in Jakarta and donated sports facilities
and equipment for the GANEFO.77
A preparatory conference for the GANEFOwas held in Jakarta in April 1963. The
PRC, Cambodia, Guinea, Indonesia, Iraq,Mali, Pakistan, North Vietnam, the United
Arab Republic (Egypt) and the Soviet Union were present. Ceylon and Yugoslavia
sent observers. The aim of the GANEFOwas agreed: ‘The Games was to be ‘‘based on
the spirit of the 1955 Bandung Conference and the Olympic ideals, and was to promote
the development of sport in new emerging nations and to cement friendly relations
among them’’’.78 At the conference, an organising committee for the Games was
established. Indonesia was elected to be the chair country. China, the United Arab
Republic and the Soviet Union became the chair countries of Asia, Africa and Europe.
The conference declared that the GANEFO would be held every four years in Third
World countries. The first Games would take place in Jakarta in November 1963. All
the Newly Emerging Forces would be invited to join the GANEFO.
Although the IOC and many IFs, including The Fe´de´ration Internationale de
Football Association (FIFA), the Fe´de´ration Internationale de Natation (FINA),
the International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF) and the International
Weightlifting Federation (IWF), warned their members not to send teams to the
GANEFO in June 1963, 48 countries from Africa, Asia, Europe, and Latin America
participated in the Games, which commenced on 10 November 1963. The Games
lasted for 12 days and 2,404 athletes competed in 20 events. Badminton was the
national sport of Indonesia and when the badminton men’s singles final took place
between China and Indonesia, it became a diplomatic game. When the Chinese
player kept ahead and was about to defeat the Indonesian player, considering the
Sino-Indonesia relations and the booming Indonesian nationalism, Marshal He
Long, head of the Chinese sports delegation, immediately instructed the Chinese
player to lose to his opponent. The Indonesian player won the gold medal and the
victory greatly pleased the Indonesian people.79
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By the time of the GANEFO, the Sino-Soviet split had taken place, dividing the
Communist camp and creating three power blocs – the United States and Western
Europe, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and the PRC – each striving for the
support of the non-aligned emerging states. The Soviet Union provided some
financial support and participated in the GANEFO. However, in order not to
jeopardise its stature in the Olympic movement, Moscow did not send its first class
Olympic calibre athletes to the Games.80 In contrast, the PRC sent its 229 best
athletes to the Games. It also provided strong political, financial, and organisational
support to the GANEFO and it was a key force in facilitating the success of the
Games.
After the Games, Chairman Liu Shaoqi and Premier Zhou Enlai sent a
congratulatory telegram to President Sukarno. It praised the GANEFO as ‘a great
victory of the newly emerging countries against the imperialism and new colonialism’s
control over international sport’.81 The GANEFO was also an inspiration to many
Third World countries. It was seen as a victory against the Western powers.82 Camara
Mamadi, the head of the Guinea delegation commented:
The development of sports and relations of friendship and solidarity among the new
emerging forces contributed in our opinion to the quest for world peace and, likewise in
the GANEFO- a positive contribution and original manifestation to the struggle against
colonialism and imperialism.83
Kim Ki Soo, head of the North Korea delegation stated that:
. . . the imperialists and the old forces of all hues have eventually failed in their intrigues
to prevent the peoples of the New Emerging Forces attending their all friendly games.
They have also failed to be an obstacle in the meeting of the delegates from the countries
of the New Emerging Forces. . ..The government of the Democratic People’s Republic
of Korea (PDRK) has actively supported the ideals of the GANEFO. . ..The delegation
of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea calls for developing an independent sport
movement of the peoples of the New Emerging Forces, completely free from
imperialism and colonialism and from the influence of the old forces of all hues.84
The GANEFO posed a real threat to the IOC and challenged its hegemony in the
Third World. During the Games a council consisting of 36 member countries was
established. It proposed that GANEFO Continental Committees should be
established in Asia, Africa, Europe, America and Australasia, and that the 36
member countries should have their own national GANEFO committees.85 Its
intention was to create a new order in world sport. Brundage, the President of the
IOC, voiced this fear in a letter to the Marquess of Exeter, the President of the
International Amateur Athletic Federation, the most important and influential
international federation. With regard to the ‘Africa Games’ proposed by some
African countries, he wrote:
If we want to hold the Olympic world together we must not let these 37 countries be led
into the GANEFO camp, which may easily happen. Peking [Beijing], China is very
active now in Africa and Congo Brazzaville has recently received from it a $20,000,000
loan. The Egyptians are organising the second GANEFO Games in Cairo in 1967 . . . the
Indonesian Embassy in Switzerland is inviting the National Federations and the Swiss
NOC [National Olympic Committee] to the reception on the anniversary of the First
GANEFO Games. This is probably also taking place in other places. The Arab
countries and a few others are sympathetic . . .We . . . will probably drive them all into
the receptive arms of the GANEFO crowd if we are not most careful.86
44 F. Hong and L. Zhouxiang
To conclude, the GANEFO movement intended to divide and fragment the
Olympic movement, to emphasise the political realities of the new world structure.
The aim of the GANEFO was ‘to build a world anew, free from colonialism and
imperialism in all their forms and manifestations’.87 Its cCharter sums it up:
To develop a community of nations imbued with the spirit of the Asian-African
Conference in Bandung in 1955 which ensures respect for each other’s national identity
and national sovereignty, strengthens friendship, and fosters cooperation towards
lasting peace among nations and towards the Brotherhood of Man. . ..Therefore, it will
encourage and promote an independent development of sports and physical culture and
sports movements in all countries of the Newly Emerging Forces. It will stimulate
sporting cooperation among the youth of the Newly Emerging Forces in order to foster
and consolidate friendly relations among them in particular and to promote amity and
world peace in general.88
The GANEFO provided the best stage for the PRC to project its image, to
extend its influence, to unite with Third World countries and to enable it to compete
with the two power blocs: the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and the United
States and Western Europe. Through the successes achieved at the Games, both in
terms of sport and diplomacy, the PRC established its leadership in the Newly
Emerging Forces and greatly reinforced its power and status in international politics.
As the Sports Minister He Long concluded,
International sports exchanges have promoted mutual understanding and friendship
between the peoples of China and many foreign countries. Together with the peoples in
third world countries, we created the GANEFO which successfully broke the monopoly
of the imperialists in international sport and promoted sport among the newly emerging
forces.89
After the First GANEFO, Beijing took the leading position in organising the
subsequent Games and grasped the opportunity to expand its influence in Asia,
Africa and Latin America through sport. The Second GANEFO was scheduled to
take place in Cairo, Capital of the United Arab Republic, in 1967, with Beijing as an
alternative site. However, the United Arab Republic requested Beijing to donate a
stadium for the second games. The request was discussed at the Ten Year
Anniversary of the 1955 Bandung Conference, which was held in Jakarta in May
1965, between the Secretary-General of the Chinese Sports Ministry, Huang Zhong
and representatives from the United Arab Republic, but failed to reach an
agreement.90 The amount of donation that Cairo requested was equal to the value of
the Algiers Conference Complex that China had donated for the Second Asian-
African Conference which was planned to be held in Algeria in 1965.91 Zhou Enlai
discussed the issue with the United Arab Republic at the Asian-African leader’s
summit in Cairo in June 1965. Due to financial constraints both parties agreed to
move the Second GANEFO to Beijing in 1967.92 The Capital Indoor Stadium was
built for this purpose.93
Furthermore, in order to reinforce its influence in Asia, a plan to host an
Asian edition of GANEFO came into being. In September 1965 the second
session of the council of the GANEFO was held in Beijing, with 39 delegations
present. A GANEFO Asian Committee was formed. Beijing played a major role
in its formation and a Chinese official became the chairman of the executive
committee of the GANEFO Asian Committee. A proposal for an Asian
GANEFO was approved and it was to take place in Cambodia in 1966. It was
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designed to compete against the IOC backed Asian Games which would also take
place in 1966.
The aim of the Asian GANEFO was to reinforce China’s leadership in the Third
World and to challenge American and Soviet powers. Chairman Mao, with his idea
of the leadership of ‘‘World Revolution’’ in mind, wrote to the Games in December
1966: ‘The struggle against imperialist America and its running dogs carried out by
people all over the world will achieve greater success’ (see Figure 4).
The Asian GANEFO was underwritten in large measure by the PRC. As in
China’s other diplomatic projects, for example the Algiers Conference Complex built
for the 1965 Second Asian-African Conference and the TAZARA Railway Project
for Tanzania and Zambia, the Chinese government helped build infrastructure in the
form of a sports stadium with 50,000 seats as well as other facilities in Phnom Penh,
the capital of Cambodia. It also helped train 300 referees for the games in five
months.94 With the support of Norodom Sihanouk, the king of Cambodia, the
Games were successfully held between 25 November and 6 December 1966, virtually
simultaneously with the Fifth Asian Games which took place in Bangkok between 9
and 20 December 1966, from which the PRC was excluded and Taiwan included.
Seventeen countries and regions with more than 2,000 athletes participated in the
Figure 4. Commemorative stamp published by the PRC for the Asian GANEFO (published
on 31 December 1966).
Source: http://tupian.hudong.com/a1_53_92_01300000397019132239923516457_jpg.html
46 F. Hong and L. Zhouxiang
Asian GANEFO. Chinese athletes competed in 18 sports events, won 133 gold
medals and broke two world records.95
However, despite the successful Asian GANEFO, the GANEFO was
approaching its end. In West Asia, the United Arab Republic was not able to
host the games as planned, due to financial problems. In Southeast Asia,
Indonesia, the founder of the GANEFO, turned its back on China after Sukarno’s
regime was overthrown by General Suharto who was backed by the United
States.96 In Northeast Asia, China, the major sponsor of the Games, was entering
the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution and did not have the time and energy to
look after the Games. The Second GANEFO, which was scheduled to be held in
Beijing in 1967, died quietly.
Conclusion
Sport in the first half of the 1960s was strongly influenced by the government’s policy
of ‘preparation for war’ and ‘eight million people eight million soldiers’. Threatened
by foreign powers from Asia and the West, national security and defence became the
priority of the country. Sports served the purpose of training masculine bodies for
the war and sport was militarised.
On the other hand this period saw close relationships between sport and China’s
foreign diplomacy. Sport began to serve the PRC’s foreign policy which focused on
uniting the newly independent countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America to
compete against the two world superpowers: the United States and the Soviet Union.
In the 1950s and first half of the 1960s, the CCP leadership allied with the NAM
member states to use the Fourth Asian Games and the GANEFO to win support
from, and to build up its position in, the Newly Emerging Forces. The Games helped
to implement China’s foreign policy to establish and consolidate friendly relations
with many Asian, African and Latin American countries. Consequently, China
successfully established its position as a leading power in the Third World and
changed the political landscape of the world which had mainly been shaped by the
western capitalist bloc led by the United States and the eastern socialist bloc led by
the Soviet Union. However, all the efforts devoted to building China into a world
power were suspended when the Cultural Revolution started in 1966.
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Communist Party (PKI) for the rebellion and began to arrest communist members in
Indonesia. It led to the purge of more than 300,000 Indonesian Communists. Between
500,000 and one million people, including many Indonesian Chinese, were killed.
Subsequently, the politically weakened Sukarno was outmanoeuvred by General Suharto
who was officially appointed the President in March 1968. See Scott, ‘The United States
and the Overthrow of Sukarno’; and Cribb, ‘Unresolved Problems in the Indonesian
Killings of 1965–1966’.
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